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INTRODUCTION 
Industrial design law protects the appearance of useful articles.  
A key requirement for eligibility is that functional features of the 
design cannot receive protection.1  This requirement pursues an 
important public interest objective, “namely that a shape whose 
essential characteristics perform a technical function and [are] 
chosen to fulfill that function may be freely used by all.”2  The 
requirement is fundamental in design law, and it exists in many 
legal jurisdictions, although it manifests itself differently in each 
system.  Regardless of the form the non-functionality requirement 
takes, applying it poses severe difficulties, because it is difficult 
(and sometimes impossible) to draw a clear line between 
functional and non-functional features.  Consequently, this area of 
law tends to be complex, which in turn creates greater uncertainty.  
The purpose of this Article, therefore, is to examine the drawbacks 
of the non-functionality requirement and to propose a mechanism 
for applying the requirement that may make it more workable. 
I. THE NON-FUNCTIONALITY REQUIREMENT 
One of the requirements for receiving design protection is that 
such protection will not cover functional elements of the article.3  
In this Part, I will present a short overview of the requirement in 
different legal systems. 
Functional elements, in a strict sense, are those features 
included in the article or device which enable it to perform its 
 
 1 See Richard G. Frenkel, Intellectual Property in the Balance: Proposals for 
Improving Industrial Design Protection in the Post-TRIPS Era, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
531, 534 (1999) (“Because copyright law protects only the aesthetic and creative 
expression of authors, the protected features of design—the parts that would be created 
by an artist or author—must be physically or conceptually separable from the product’s 
features.”). 
 2 See Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Elecs. NV v. Remington Consumer Prods. 
Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-05475, ¶ 80.  
 3 It should be noted that under the TRIPS agreement, this requirement is voluntary. 
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 25(1), Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (“Members may provide that such protection shall not 
extend to designs dictated essentially by technical or functional considerations.”).   
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intended function.4  The basic justification for the non-
functionality requirement is that the external appearance of the 
article—and not its functional aspect—is protected in design law.5  
The function of the article or device is covered by patent law,6 
which establishes extensive thresholds in order to balance, on the 
one hand, creating incentives for the development of new 
inventions7 against, on the other hand, securing maximum benefits 
for the public.8  The aim of industrial design law, however, is not 
to encourage the development of new technologies, but rather to 
encourage the development of their external appearance.9  
Accordingly, the threshold for eligibility refers only to appearance, 
without consideration of the functional elements, so as not to 
undermine the delicate balance established in patent law.10  
Therefore, technical features which are not protected by patent law 
are open to all, and thus the public’s interest is promoted.11  This is 
a fundamental principle of design law, and it is maintained 
regardless of the manner in which designs are protected. 
A. The Non-Functionality Requirement in U.S. Law 
In the United States, there are currently three major legal routes 
for protecting industrial designs: copyright law,12 patent law13 and 
trademark law,14 all of which normally provide protection only to 
 
 4 See infra Part II for a discussion of what exactly functional elements are.  
 5 Orit Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 1105, 1107 (2008). 
 6 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 
7
 See id. 
 8 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148–49 (1989) 
(“Sections 102(a) and (b) operate in tandem to exclude from consideration for patent 
protection knowledge that is already available to the public.  They express a 
congressional determination that the creation of a monopoly in such information would 
not only serve no socially useful purpose, but would in fact injure the public by removing 
existing knowledge from public use.”). 
 9 See id. at 148 (“To qualify for protection, a design must present an aesthetically 
pleasing appearance that is not dictated by function alone, and must satisfy the other 
criteria of patentability.”). 
 10 See id. 
 11 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
 12 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2006).  
 13 See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03, 171. 
 14 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125. 
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non-functional features.  Since there are inherent complexities in 
applying the non-functional requirement, all of these intellectual 
property regimes must address this issue. 
1. Copyright Law 
Of the three legal routes for protecting industrial designs, 
copyright law is the most complex.15  Currently, the Copyright Act 
provides protection for designs by including “applied art” in the 
subject matter of the Act and by including the requirement that the 
protected features are non-functional: 
“Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” include 
two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of 
fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints 
and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, 
diagrams, models, and technical drawings, 
including architectural plans.  Such works shall 
include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as 
their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian 
aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, 
as defined in this section, shall be considered a 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and 
only to the extent that, such design incorporates 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be 
identified separately from, and are capable of 
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of 
the article.16 
This route for protecting applied art through copyright law 
reflects codification of the Supreme Court’s 1954 landmark 
decision in Mazer v. Stein,17 which granted copyright protection to 
statues of dancing figures despite their industrial use as lamp 
bases.18  Soon after Mazer, the U.S. Copyright Office adopted new 
regulations that introduced the concept of “separability” into 
 
 15 See Fischman Afori, supra note 5, at 1018–22 (summarizing the copyright path for 
protecting industrial design in the United States). 
 16 17 U.S.C. § 101.  
 17 347 U.S. 201 (1954).  
 18 See id. at 218.                                                                                                                                                                 
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American copyright law.19  Under these regulations, the standard 
for copyrighting applied art was whether “the shape of a utilitarian 
article incorporates features such as artistic sculpture, carving, or 
pictorial representation, which can be identified separately and are 
capable of existing independently as a work of art.”20  Thus, the 
non-functionality doctrine has, in American copyright law, turned 
into a test of “separability,”21 which not only prohibits protection 
of functional features, but also requires that those non-functional 
protected features be separated from the functional aspects of the 
object.22  The problem that this creates is obvious: non-functional 
features that cannot be separated from the functional ones are 
deprived of protection.23  This outcome cried out for a judicial 
resolution of the problem through a creative interpretation of the 
“separability” test, since many worthy designs combine functional 
and non-functional components in a non-separable way.  Courts 
have therefore developed two tests for measuring the separation 
between “artistic” and “utilitarian” features: a physical test, and a 
conceptual test.24  The physical test simply asks whether the 
ornamental element can be separated from the functional device or 
component.25  For example, registration was precluded for lighting 
 
 19 See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2009). 
 20 Fischman Afori, supra note 5, at 1119 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c)). 
 21 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this 
section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the 
extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be 
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
aspects of the article.” (emphasis added)); Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 
372 F.3d 913, 922–32 (7th Cir. 2004); Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 
834 F.2d 1142, 1143–49 (2d Cir. 1987); Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 
F.2d 411, 414–19 (2d Cir. 1985); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 803–05 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978). 
 22 Fischman Afori, supra note 5, at 1121.  
 23 Id. 
 24 For the physical test, see Esquire, 591 F.2d at 803–05.  For the conceptual test, see 
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 25 See Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art & Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to 
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 730–31 (1983).  Denicola criticizes 
the physical test derived from Mazer v. Stein and relies on legislative history to argue that 
Congress conceived of a more abstract conceptual test in § 101: 
Because Mazer provided the focal point for the congressional 
analysis, it is tempting to approach the separability test in essentially 
physical terms. In Mazer, the dancing figures at issue could be 
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fixtures since all of the design elements were directly related to the 
useful functions of the article and the fixtures did not contain 
elements, either alone or in combination, which were capable of 
existing independently as a copyrightable pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural work apart from the utilitarian aspect.26   
By contrast, the conceptual test asks whether there is a 
potential aesthetic purpose for the design as a whole, which is 
different from the functional one.27  One such example is a belt 
buckle that is worn for ornamentation other than on the waist.28  In 
the case in question, the court stated that 
the primary ornamental aspect of the . . . buckles is 
conceptually separable from their subsidiary 
utilitarian function.  This conclusion is not at 
variance with the expressed congressional intent to 
distinguish copyrightable applied art and 
uncopyrightable industrial design. . . .  [T]hese 
buckles may be considered jewelry, the form of 
which is subject to copyright protection.29 
“While the physical separation test reflects a narrow, literal 
interpretation of the statute, the conceptual separation test is 
 
physically separated from the utilitarian objects into which they had 
been incorporated by the twist of a socket and a sharp tug on an 
electric cord. Reliance on this simplistic notion of physical 
separation, however, is misplaced. The legislative history 
unequivocally indicates that pictorial works adorning useful articles 
are entitled to copyright, yet the pattern dyed into a bolt of cloth or 
painted on a china cup cannot be physically detached from the object 
itself. In addition, some features of utilitarian objects that can be 
physically separated are clearly not intended to fall within the scope 
of copyright. An ordinary television cabinet may be physically 
removed from the set itself, yet protection will not be forthcoming. 
Physical separability is a poor touchstone, inaccurate as a descriptive 
concept, and devoid of normative implications. The legislative 
history acknowledges the necessity of a more esoteric approach, 
referring at one point to “some element that, physically or 
conceptually, can be identified as separable.” 
Id. at 730 (emphasis in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1476, at 55 (1976)). 
 26 See, e.g., Esquire, 591 F.2d at 798. 
 27 See Kieselstein-Cord, 623 F.2d at 993.  
 28 See id. 
 29 Id. (citations omitted).  
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broader” and allows for extensive protection of industrial designs 
through copyright.30  As a result, there has been considerable 
criticism of the “separability” criterion as unclear, impossible to 
carry out, arbitrary, and subject to manipulation.31  A recent article 
summarizing the ongoing debate over the conceptual separability 
test concluded that the “separability [test] has caused conflict 
among circuits even twenty-five years after Congress codified the 
doctrine.  This suggests that the currently available tests are both 
confusing and unable to effectively determine the copyrightability 
of useful articles.”32 
2. Patent Law 
Patent law also provides for the protection of designs through a 
specially-tailored “design patent right.”33  This provision is 
intended to fill the gap between copyright and patent protection 
and encourage the development of decorative arts.34  To this end, 
an additional requirement of an ornamental design35  was added to 
the standard patent requirements of novelty36 and non-
obviousness,37 provided that the “ornamentality” was not dictated 
by functional considerations.38  At the same time, the utility 
 
 30 Fischman Afori, supra note 5, at 1121.  
 31 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE  § 2.5.3(b)–(c) 
(Little, Brown & Co. 1989); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 2.08(B)(3) (2005); Eric Setliff, Copyright and Industrial Design: An 
“Alternative Design” Alternative, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 49, 63 (2006); see also J.H. 
Reichman, Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative View of 
the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 267, 350–65 (1983) (explaining 
that the separability framework was rendered ineffective by the absence of a special 
design law). 
 32 See Barton R. Keyes, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing Debate Surrounding 
Conceptual Separability in American Copyright Law, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 111 (2008). 
 33 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006). 
 34 ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 357 (Supp. 2006) (internal citation omitted); 
see also DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1:1.04(1) (2005). 
 35 35 U.S.C. § 171 (stating that “[w]hoever invents any new, original and ornamental 
design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title”).           
 36 Id. § 102. 
 37 Id. § 103(a). 
 38 CHISUM, supra note 34, § 1.04[2][c]; see also 35 U.S.C. § 171. 
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requirement, which is otherwise compulsory for patents,39 was 
dropped.40  Thus, unlike “regular” inventions, a patent-covering 
design consists of aesthetic features, such as “surface 
ornamentation,”41 although most other patentability requirements 
are maintained.42  The result is that design patents protect only the 
ornamental aspects and not the functional aspects of the design,43 
leading to the same problem that we saw in copyright law: how are 
ornamental aspects distinguishable from the functional aspects in a 
product whose design incorporates both?  Consequently, when 
aesthetics and function merge, patent design protection does not 
offer full protection for many designs.44  For example, a design 
patent was registered for the ornamental design of a golf glove,45 a 
chair,46 and a jewelry ring.47  A design patent was also issued for 
the original Coca-Cola bottle.48  The question in all such registered 
design patents is how the ornamental feature can be separated from 
the functional features, and how such separation will affect the 
protection given to the design patent as a whole. 
 
 39 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”).  
 40 See id. § 171; CHISUM, supra note 34, § 1.04[2][c]. 
 41 MERGES ET AL., supra note 34, at 357. 
 42 35 U.S.C. § 171; CHISUM, supra note 34, § 1.04[2][c]. 
 43 See L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 44 See Anne Theodore Briggs, Hung Out to Dry: Clothing Design Protection Pitfalls in 
United States Law, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 169, 169–71 (2002) (arguing that 
clothing design is often viewed as a useful art and thus denied design protection); Ralph 
S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1356–57 (1987) 
(stating that design patents are often held invalid based partly on the subjective nature of 
the validity inquiry); Frenkel, supra note 1, at 534, 555–58 (describing various problems 
with design patents, including the hurdles encountered when applying a conceptual 
separability test); Regan E. Keebaugh, Intellectual Property and the Protection of 
Industrial Design: Are Sui Generis Protection Measures the Answer to Vocal Opponents 
and a Reluctant Congress?, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 255, 260–63 (2005) (arguing that the 
non-obviousness and non-functionality requirements of design patents prevent protection 
from being given to designs). 
 45 U.S. Patent No. D308,436 (filed Sept. 22, 1986) (issued June 12, 1990). 
 46 U.S. Patent No. D371,251 (filed July 28, 1995) (issued July 2, 1996). 
 47 U.S. Patent No. D302,954 (filed Sept. 21, 1987) (issued Aug. 22, 1989). 
 48 U.S. Patent No. D48,160 (issued Nov. 16, 1915).  
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3. Trademark Law 
The third route for protecting designs in the U.S. is through 
trademark law, or a trade dress claim.  Trade dress is “the 
appearance of a product when that appearance is used to identify 
the producer” or the origin of goods.49  The trade dress may 
include the product’s exterior design.50  The use of this third route 
for design protection has become increasingly popular and 
troublesome because unlike the other two routes of protection, it 
potentially allows for a limitless period of protection.51  Courts 
approve trademark protection for a product’s design if it acquires 
sufficient distinctiveness (secondary meaning) in order to function 
as a trademark.52  In other words, the design must function as a 
means to identify the origin of goods.53 
Another important requirement for protection of a trademark in 
general is that the mark does not contain functional elements.54  
The non-functionality requirement was first developed in common 
law,55 and was finally codified as part of federal trademark law in 
 
 49 See Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 338 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 50 See Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1541 (11th Cir. 1986) (explaining 
that the trade dress at issue is the packaging of ice cream bars). 
 51 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of 
Product Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. REV. 471, 478–79 (1997); Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 
IOWA L. REV. 611, 624 (1999) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, The Death Of Ontology]; Judith 
Beth Prowda, The Trouble with Trade Dress Protection of Product Design, 61 ALB. L. 
REV. 1309, 1324–25 (1998) (explaining several problems that arise when using trade 
dress to protect products designs). 
 52 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000) (“The 
attribution of inherent distinctiveness to certain categories of word marks and product 
packaging derives from the fact that the very purpose of attaching a particular word to a 
product, or encasing it in a distinctive packaging, is most often to identify the source of 
the product.”). 
 53 See id.; Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992); J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7.25 (4th ed. 
2006).     
 54 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2006) (“In a civil action for trade dress infringement 
under this chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who 
asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be 
protected is not functional.”); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 
164 (1995).   
 55 JEROME GILSON, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2A.04[1] (2009).  
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1998.56  The codification of the non-functionality requirement was 
written broadly, so as to encompass the range of definitions that 
had been provided by courts.57  The analysis of functionality by a 
court requires it to determine whether the word, term, symbol, or 
device is “essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it 
affects the cost or quality of the article.”58  This analysis can cause 
considerable complications when it comes to protecting design as a 
trademark because of the difficulty in distinguishing between the 
function of a product’s design as an aspect that is intended to 
attract customers to the product itself, and its function as an 
indication of the product’s source of origin.59  In fact, only 
designed trademarks which could be separated from the designed 
device could reach this test of both not being “essential to the use 
or purpose of the article” and not affecting “the cost or quality of 
the article.”60  As a result, the unintended consequence of this 
analysis is that if the purpose of a design is achieved, and the 
design is unique and enjoys success in the market and therefore 
acquires the ability to function as an indication of source of origin, 
then it would be deprived of protection because the design had 
affected the cost of the product.  However, if the design fails, in the 
sense that it has no market success, then though it may be 
acknowledged as a trademark from the functionality test’s 
perspective, it will not develop the ability to function as an 
 
 56 See Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, tit. II, § 
201(a)(4), 112 Stat. 3064, 3070 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) 
(specifying the requirements for trademark protections as including non-functionality)). 
 57 See GILSON, supra note 55, § 2A.04[1] (discussing Congress’s attempt to unify the 
various functionality tests that had existed within the circuit courts). 
 58 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 24 (2001).   
 59 See Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology, supra note 51, at 624. 
 60 See id. at 639.  For example, a design of a lemon press may present a considerable 
development of the aesthetic appearance of lemon presses in general, and hence be sold 
for a higher price.  At the same time, it could function as an indication of its source of 
origin due to its substantial success in the market.  Under the functionality requirement, 
which includes a parameter of effect on the cost or quality of the article, the design of 
such a press will not be protected as a trademark, since there is no separable symbol apart 
from the product’s design.  For an example of this scenario, see Alessi, Juicy-Salif, 
Citrus-Squeezer, http://www.alessi.com/en/2/110/kitchen-accessories/psjs-juicy-salif-
citrus-squeezer (last visited Mar. 18, 2010).  
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indication of source of origin and therefore will not function as a 
trademark.61 
The clash between the non-functionality requirement and the 
function of the product’s appearance in enhancing the market value 
of the product was at the heart of trade dress cases decided by the 
Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court held that there are two tests 
for determining functionality as it applies in trade dress cases: the 
traditional test,62 and the competitive necessity test.63  In TrafFix 
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,64 the Court referred to 
the traditional test (utilitarian functionality), according to which a 
proposed mark is functional “if it is essential to the use or purpose 
of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”65  In 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.,66 the Court referred to the 
competitive necessity test (aesthetic functionality), according to 
which a product design is functional “because of its aesthetic value 
only if it confers a significant benefit that cannot practically be 
duplicated by the use of alternative designs.”67  This second test 
will be further discussed below. 
 
 61 See Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952) (“If the 
particular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product, the 
interest in free competition permits its imitation in the absence of a patent or copyright.  
On the other hand, where the feature or, more aptly, design, is a mere arbitrary 
embellishment, a form of dress for the goods primarily adopted for purposes of 
identification and individuality and, hence, unrelated to basic consumer demands in 
connection with the product, imitation may be forbidden where the requisite showing of 
secondary meaning is made.  Under such circumstances, since effective competition may 
be undertaken without imitation, the law grants protection.” (footnotes omitted)); see also 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 742 cmt. a (1938) (indicating that “[w]hen goods are 
bought largely for their aesthetic value, their features may be functional because they 
definitely contribute to that value and thus aid the performance of an object for which the 
goods are intended”).  
 62 See infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.                                                                                                              
 63 See infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.                                                                                                             
 64 532 U.S. 23 (2001).   
 65 Id. at 24 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)).   
 66 514 U.S. 159 (1995).                                                                                                                                                     
 67 Id. at 170 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c 
(1993)).  
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B. The Non-Functionality Requirement in English Law 
The situation in England is even more complicated than in the 
United States, as industrial designs may be protected by any one of 
five methods: three routes under domestic legislation, covering 
registered designs,68 unregistered designs,69 and copyright;70 and 
two E.U. protections, covering registered and unregistered 
designs.71  All these routes share the same basic rule that no 
protection is granted to functional features.  For example, article 
7(1) of the Design Directive provides that “[a] design right shall 
not subsist in features of appearance of a product which are solely 
dictated by its technical function.”72  Similar provisions forbidding 
protection of functional elements have been introduced into 
national legislation.73 
With regard to the protection of designs through trademarks, 
the Trade Mark Directive also specifies that there can be no 
protection of “the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a 
technical result.”74  This rule has been applied by courts through 
the same legal analysis that is employed with respect to industrial 
designs, namely by asking whether “the shape of the product [is] 
attributable only to the technical result” and whether there are 
other shapes which can obtain the same technical result.75  
However, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) in Koninklijke 
Philips Electronics v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd.76 held 
that the ability to achieve the same technical result by other shapes 
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the shape is not 
 
 68 See Registered Designs Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 88, § 1 (Eng.). 
 69 See Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 226 (Eng.). 
 70 See id. § 1.  
 71 See Council Directive 98/71, art. 7(1), 1998 O.J. (L 289) 31 (EC).  
 72 Id.; see also id. at art. 7(2) (“A design right shall not subsist in features of 
appearance of a product which must necessarily be reproduced in their exact form and 
dimensions in order to permit the product in which the design is incorporated or to which 
it is applied to be mechanically connected to or placed in, around or against another 
product so that either product may perform its function.”). 
 73 See, e.g., Registered Designs Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 88, § 1C(1) (Eng.). 
 74 Council Directive 89/104, art. 3(1)(e), 1989 O.J. (L 40) 3 (EC). 
 75 Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Elecs. NV v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., 
2002 E.C.R. I-05475, ¶¶ 74–83. 
76  Case C-299/99, 2002 E.C.R. I-05475.  
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functional, and therefore a design’s registration may still be 
rejected.77 
II. INQUIRIES INTO THE NON-FUNCTIONALITY REQUIREMENT 
At first blush, the review of the current legal situation both in 
the U.S. and in England leads to the conclusion that the non-
functionality requirement is fundamental for the protection of 
designs.  However, a more probing inquiry into the requirement 
reveals some complications which are hard to overcome.  In the 
following section, I will review some of these complications, all of 
which stem from the fact that the term “functionality” is both 
broad and vague. 
The first complication stems from the fact that the term 
“functionality” does not have a clear and unequivocal definition: if 
functional features are to be deprived of protection, then the law 
should define (or at least explain) what “functionality” means with 
respect to design features.78 
The second complication stems from the nature of industrial 
design as typically integrating function and aesthetics into one 
entity, with the result that either protection over functional features 
will be permitted or protection over aesthetical features will be 
prohibited.  Both outcomes are contrary to the basic principle of 
industrial design law, which is to protect the aesthetical external 
appearance of articles without protecting their functional 
features.79 
 
 77 Id. ¶ 84 (“In the light of those considerations, the answer to the fourth question must 
be that Article 3(1)(e), second indent, of the Directive must be interpreted to mean that a 
sign consisting exclusively of the shape of a product is unregistrable by virtue thereof if it 
is established that the essential functional features of that shape are attributable only to 
the technical result.  Moreover, the ground for refusal or invalidity of registration 
imposed by that provision cannot be overcome by establishing that there are other shapes 
which allow the same technical result to be obtained.”); see also Amp, Inc. v. Utilux Pty 
Ltd, [1971] F.S.R. 572, 576 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
 78 The Qualitex case is an example of the unclear language used by courts in defining 
the term “functionality.” See generally Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 
(1995). 
 79 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  An illustrative example may be the design 
of the lemon press described supra note 60, or other different kitchen appliances, such as 
coffee makers or food processors.     
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The third complication is the unclear weight of aesthetics in the 
legal analysis.  If aesthetics are a function, then it is clear that the 
non-functionality requirement is tautological in the context of 
industrial design law because the whole purpose of this law is to 
provide protection for a product’s aesthetic, as opposed to its 
technical features.  Therefore, in such a case, the definition of the 
term “functional” needs to be narrowed to refer only to technical-
physical functions, rather than including all features that serve a 
purpose. 
A. What Is a Functional Design? 
Because “functionality” is a vague term that lends itself to a 
number of definitions, the basic principle of rejecting protection 
for functional features is itself unclear.  The question is, therefore, 
how non-functional design should be defined.  As explained above, 
the English law follows the Directive’s language, which states the 
test as whether the design is “solely dictated by its technical 
function.”80  This definition indicates that functionality should be 
examined from a technical point of view.  However, this test for 
assessing non-functionality of designs opens a whole range of legal 
and theoretical questions relating to the “solely dictated” aspect of 
the test.  When should it be concluded that a design is “solely 
dictated” by technical requirements?  If a wholly functional article 
can be formed in a variety of shapes, is its design solely dictated by 
its function?81  After all, since there are several effective options 
for shaping the article, then the choice that is ultimately made 
could be based on non-technical considerations, whether aesthetic 
(which design would be more appealing to the eye) or economic 
(which design would be cheaper).  The House of Lords discussed 
this issue in Amp, Inc. v. Utilux Pty Ltd82 and concluded that 
“solely dictated” by technical-functional features means that the 
designer decided on the shape of the article solely on the basis of 
whether the article would function in that manner, without 
 
 80 Council Directive 98/71, art. 7(1), 1998 O.J. (L 289) 31 (EC). 
 81 MARTIN HOWE & A.D. RUSSELL-CLARKE, RUSSELL-CLARKE ON INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS 
38–40 (Sweet & Maxwell 2005) (“Where a shape is adopted by a designer upon the sole 
requirement of functional ends, i.e. to make the article work and not to appeal to the eye, 
then the provision excludes it from statutory protection.”). 
 82 [1971] F.S.R. 572 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
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considering its aesthetic appeal.83  This did not mean, however, 
that there were no other pure technical-functional possible designs 
for the same article.84  In other words, according to the House of 
Lords, the question of “solely dictated” by technical-function 
features is a subjective test which examines whether the designer 
had in mind only technical considerations in contrast to aesthetical 
considerations.85 
This test echoes the subjective test in King Features Syndicate, 
Inc. v. O & M Kleeman, Ltd.,86 which held that, in establishing 
whether a design of a doll should be regarded as a copyrighted 
work or an industrial design, the intent of the designer was 
determinative.87  But the subjective intent of the creator or designer 
is a weak test, since it can be easily manipulated.88  Nor does it 
serve any of the goals underlying intellectual property law.89  
Whether a design is “solely dictated” by functional features should 
depend on an objective test that can be judged solely on the basis 
of the design itself.  The fact that many designs are commissioned, 
whether in the context of employment relations or not,90 further 
complicates matters if the test for functionality is the subjective 
intent of the designer; it raises the additional question of whether it 
is the commissioner’s or the designer’s intent that is relevant.  Lord 
Reid himself admitted in Amp, Inc. that the ambiguity and 
controversy surrounding the eligibility of designs “has centered 
around the word ‘dictated’ which is a metaphorical word out of a 
place in a statutory definition.”91  It should be mentioned that in an 
earlier decision the House of Lords called for an objective test, 
according to which the relevant question should not be the 
designer’s intention but the effect on subsequent designers and the 
 
 83 See id. at 583. 
 84 See id. 
 85 See id. 
 86 [1941] A.C. 417 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
 87 Id. at 429.  
 88 For example, how can one tell whether the designer of a screwdriver had in mind 
only technical goals in choosing the exact lines of the device or whether some lines were 
chosen also (or only) for aesthetic reasons. See U.S. Patent No. D340,633 app. A (filed 
Jan. 21, 1992) (issued Oct. 26, 1993).  
 89 See Fischman Afori, supra note 5, at 1166–68.  
 90 See id. at 1167. 
 91 See Amp, Inc. v. Utilux Pty Ltd, [1971] F.S.R. 572, 578 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
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effective possibilities to use other alternatives in achieving the 
same functional outcome.92  Two decades later, in 2002, the ECJ 
similarly held that where the essential functional characteristics of 
the shape of a product are attributable solely to the technical result, 
the registration of that shape is precluded, “even if that technical 
result can be achieved by other shapes.”93  However, the ECJ 
refrained from construing any instructive test, whether subjective 
or objective, for such judicial conclusion.94 
It seems, then, that the question of whether a design can be 
regarded as “solely dictated” by functional criteria when it is 
merely one chosen from among a number of possibilities, each one 
of which is capable of delivering the same functional goal, is 
ultimately a question of proportionality.  This question should be 
determined by the courts (or other relevant tribunal) by asking 
whether the overall impression from the shape of the object 
suggests a technical or an aesthetic basis for the choice.  This “eye 
of the judge” test is a common one in design law, and it is often the 
ultimate test for eligibility.95  This test has no definable 
measurements and reflects the underlying preference for common 
law by deciding on a case-by-case basis, according to the judge’s 
reading of the specific facts of the case. 
B. Separating Function from Aesthetics 
Separating the functional features of a design from its non-
functional ones is an even more complicated task.  The question 
discussed above was how to treat cases in which a functional 
 
 92 See Stratford Auto Components Ltd. v. Britax (London) Ltd., [1964] R.P.C. 183, 
189–90 (H.L.) (U.K.) (“It is of course true that the designer’s intention may greatly assist 
the court in its investigation of the result consequent upon the adoption of his manner of 
its performance, and in many of the cases . . . proof of intention to monopolise a function 
has been accepted as sufficient to establish the non-registrability of the features designed 
to secure that result. . . .  None the less, as I read this sub-section, the test to be applied is 
an objective one, namely whether or not the function to be subserved by the article to 
which the design is applied imposes such control upon the freedom of the manufacturer 
as in substance to leave him no option but to adopt a feature or features appearing in the 
representation of the registered design . . . .” (internal citation omitted)). 
 93 Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Elecs. NV v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., 
2002 E.C.R. I-05475, ¶ 83. 
 94 See id. ¶¶ 73–85. 
 95 See HOWE & RUSSELL-CLARKE, supra note 81, at 37–42. 
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design was motivated by obtaining a technical result but where 
there were other possibilities for achieving the same technical 
result.  The answer presented is that there can be several purely 
functional designs for the same technical goal, and the fact that 
non-functional considerations led a person to choose one of the 
technical possibilities does not negate the design’s purely 
functional nature.  A related, overriding question is, then, how the 
law should treat cases in which choosing one of the purely 
functional designs was made due to non-functional features which 
are integrated with the functional shape: are the non-functional 
features swallowed into the functional nature?  Or do the 
functional features become protectable because they are merged 
into the non-functional features? 
This overriding difficulty in applying the non-functionality 
requirement stems from the fact that many contemporary designs 
combine functional and aesthetical elements, and it is impossible to 
separate the two.  These designs follow the “Form-Follows-
Function” artistic school and the philosophy of functionalism 
which originated in the 1920s,96 and which still dominates 
contemporary design.97 According to functionalism, the best 
designs are those in which the appearance springs truly from the 
structure and is a logical expression of it.98  However, achieving a 
visual effect by eliminating ornamentation must not be confused 
with failing to consider visual effect entirely.  Functionalism is 
concerned specifically with aesthetics; these aesthetics, though, are 
merged with the function.99  Thus, the requirement for not 
protecting functional elements becomes highly problematic 
 
 96 Setliff, supra note 31, at 62. 
 97 An example of a contemporary design which follows the “Form-Follows-Function” 
philosophy is Philippe Starck’s lemon press “Juicy Salif,” produced by Alessi in 1990. 
See Posting of Angie to Introduction to Design, Philippe Starck—Juicy Salif, 
http://introtodesign.blogspot.com/2008/06/philippe-starck-juicy-salif.html (June 24, 
2008); supra note 60.  Other examples are the many registered designs for chairs. See, 
e.g., U.S. Patent No. D514,835 (filed Jan. 19, 2005) (issued Feb. 14, 2006).  
 98 Setliff, supra note 31, at 62 (“According to this Functionalist philosophy, the usual 
character of any product was best determined by the internal logic of its construction and 
mechanism.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 99 See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 74: DESIGNS § 2.12 (1992), 
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/74. 
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because it is not possible to separate physically the functional 
features from the non-functional features. 
There are several models for dealing with this problem of 
merged functional and non-functional features of a design.  One 
model is to preserve the rule rejecting protection of non-functional 
features, and when the features are merged, to provide no 
protection to the design as a whole.  This is the American model, 
which is governed by the separability test,100 as described above, 
and which is justly criticized as impossible to carry out, arbitrary, 
and subject to manipulation.101  Another model is the English one, 
which allows registration of merged designs.102  However, this 
model also has its shortcomings; courts have limited the possibility 
of registering these kinds of designs when doing so would impede 
the design freedom of future designers by leaving no viable options 
for alternative designs.103  The problem created by such a court-
made rule is clear: on what basis, other than subjective impression, 
is a judge to decide that a design which merges aesthetic appeal 
and functionality has met the threshold requirement of limiting 
future options for designers?  Such a decision can always be 
criticized as arbitrary. 
C. Are Aesthetics Also a Function? 
Another complication stemming from the non-functionality 
requirement becomes apparent when we delve into the meaning of 
the term “aesthetics” in the context of useful articles.  One may ask 
what considerable efforts and investments made in the external 
appearance (as opposed to the underlying technology) of articles 
are intended to achieve.  The answer is that aesthetics reflect an 
added value, covering everything from personal enjoyment to 
 
 100 See supra Part I.A.1. 
 101 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.  
 102 See In re Wingate’s Registered Design, (1935) 52 R.P.C. 126, 131 (Ch.) (U.K.) 
(“[S]o long as the design, qua design, is something which makes an appeal to the eye and 
is new or original, it is properly a subject matter of registration . . . notwithstanding that it 
also involves a method of construction which may be entitled to protection as a patent.”).  
 103 See Stratford Auto Components Ltd. v. Britax (London) Ltd., [1964] R.P.C. 183 
(H.L.) (U.K.); HOWE & RUSSELL-CLARKE, supra note 81, at 95–96. 
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social status indicators.104  All these values contribute something 
real to the product and justify the consumers’ choices to buy it.  
Therefore, it is arguable that aesthetics have a function in 
themselves.105  Another way of thinking about this is to redefine 
the concept of “function.”  If we accept the definition of function 
as “a way for achieving an aim,”106 though, then aesthetics is 
indeed a function.107  Rejecting the idea of aesthetics as a 
“function” implies a narrow definition of “function” as technical 
function or even physical function.  This is in fact the way the E.U. 
Design Directive understands the term in the context of industrial 
design law, as it uses the words “technical-function.”108  Because 
aesthetics do not have a technical or a physical function, they are 
not a function as the term is used in industrial design law.  As 
discussed above, however, aesthetics cannot be easily separated 
from the technical or physical features of the article. 
The development of the trade dress claim in U.S. law 
exemplifies an attempt to determine whether aesthetics should be 
considered a function.  Trade dress, as explained above, refers to 
the design or appearance of goods (or services).109  Courts were 
concerned that the product’s dress is functional, either in the strict 
technical or broad aesthetic sense, and accordingly developed the 
concept of aesthetic functionality.  Whereas strict functionality 
examines whether the dress adds something to the use of the article 
 
 104 See JULES STUYCK, PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN TERMS OF PACKAGING 
PRESENTATION, ADVERTISING, TRADE MARKS, ETC. 6–7, 10–11 (Kluwer 1983); see also 
Fischman Afori, supra note 5, at 1110–15.  
 105 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, § 2.5.3(c) (“[P]urchasers of artistically designed 
useful articles typically have two motives: to use the article and to enjoy its design.  A 
consumer who pays $662 for an ornamental belt buckle clearly wants something that will 
do more than hold up his pants.”).         
 106 Function could be defined as “the natural action or intended purpose of a person or 
thing in a specific role.” The Free Dictionary, Function, http://www.thefree 
dictionary.com/function (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).  
 107 See HOWE & RUSSELL-CLARKE, supra note 81, at 42–44 (“Provided that the shape is 
capable of giving to the article to which it is applied a definite individuality of 
appearance, which renders it distinguishable from the ‘fundamental’ or unadorned form 
of the article, it will be registrable as a design even though some mechanical advantage 
necessarily follows from the shape in question.”).   
 108 Council Directive 98/71, art. 7(1), 1998 O.J. (L 289) 31 (EC). 
 109 See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
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(i.e., utilitarian functionality),110 aesthetic functionality examines 
whether the dress, in addition to its ability to function as a 
trademark, makes the article more appealing.111  Aesthetic 
functionality applies when the appearance of a product has a 
significance that is not easily duplicated by substitute designs.112  
A good example of aesthetic functionality is given in the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition: 
A is the first seller to market candy intended for 
Valentine’s Day in heart-shaped boxes.  Evidence 
establishes that the shape of the box is an important 
factor in the appeal of the product to a significant 
number of consumers.  Because there are no 
alternative designs capable of satisfying the 
aesthetic desires of these prospective purchasers, 
the design of the box is functional . . . .113 
Until 2001, the approach adopted by the courts was that when 
articles were bought largely for their aesthetic value, their features 
could be functional because they contributed to their value and 
affected their cost, thus furthering the purpose for which the 
articles were intended.114 
In TrafFix, however, the Supreme Court somewhat narrowed 
this approach by explaining that aesthetic and utilitarian 
functionalities must be distinguished from each other.115  TrafFix 
involved an expired utility patent for a road sign, which had special 
features that enabled the sign to withstand strong winds.116  Since 
the utility patent had expired, the plaintiff tried to pursue a trade 
dress claim against a competitor that had copied its design.117  The 
 
 110 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 111 See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.  
 112 MCCARTHY, supra note 53, § 7:79.  For a thorough review of the aesthetic 
functionality doctrine, see GILSON, supra note 55, § 2A.04(5).  
 113 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c., illus. 8 (1995); see 
Bonazoli v. R.S.V.P. Int’l, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 218, 226 (D.R.I. 2005) (finding that the 
plaintiff’s heart-shaped measuring spoons were functional). 
 114 See Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952); see also 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 742 cmt. a (1938). 
 115 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001).   
 116 See id. at 25. 
 117 Id. at 26. 
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Supreme Court held that with respect to the design of the product 
no trade dress could be invoked;118  those specific features were 
the same ones that had been included in the utility patent claim, 
which were therefore inherently functional.119  The term for which 
protection over a utility patent was granted could not be stretched 
through a trade dress claim because it would undermine the 
legislature’s intent to limit the term of protection over functional 
features.120  At the same time, the Court also held that “in a case 
where a manufacturer seeks to protect arbitrary, incidental, or 
ornamental aspects of features of a product found in the patent 
claims, such as arbitrary curves in the legs or an ornamental pattern 
painted on the springs, a different result might obtain.”121  In other 
words, the Supreme Court adopted a narrow understanding of the 
term “functional,” as including features of the type included in a 
utility patent, while excluding ornamental features from the 
functionality umbrella.  In effect, the Supreme Court decided that, 
for purposes of industrial design, aesthetics are not a function.  
The decision thus narrows the functionality test because it 
invalidates both the competitive necessity test and the effect on the 
cost of the article test.122 
This could have resulted in a flood of trade dress cases seeking 
to protect ornamental features added to utilitarian products, which 
would have undermined the Supreme Court’s declared policy not 
to allow over-extension of trade dress.123  Nevertheless, TrafFix 
did not refer to the inability to separate the ornamental or 
aesthetics of a design from its utilitarian functional features.  It 
thus may be understood as allowing trade dress protection only 
when the ornamental part can be separated from the functional 
elements, therefore closing the floodgates of the trade dress 
route.124  In reality, however, in a number of cases after TrafFix, 
 
 118 See id. at 30. 
 119 See id. at 32. 
 120 See id. at 34–35.  
 121 Id. at 34. 
 122 See Kerry S. Taylor, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 205, 217 (2002). 
 123 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 
213 (2000).  
 124 See Taylor, supra note 122, at 219. 
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courts did recognize a trade dress claim in cases of merged 
ornamental and utilitarian features,125 and consequently the precise 
boundaries of the trade dress route are unclear.126 
Thus, even if there is a clear rule that aesthetics are not a 
function, and functionality in industrial design law is narrowly 
interpreted to mean technical, physical, or utilitarian function, 
there is still a fundamental problem in the actual application of the 
non-functional requirement. This is because the aesthetics of an 
article often merge with its technical, physical, and utilitarian 
features.  Given the limitless range of possible designs, a bright-
line rule cannot be formulated. This is the fundamental obstacle in 
industrial design law, which has resulted in considerable ambiguity 
and in an illogical development of this branch of intellectual 
property law.  Yet, it is clear that it is not possible to drop the non-
functionality requirement because it is critical for separating patent 
law from industrial design law. 
 
 125 See, e.g., Eco Mfg. v. Honeywell, 357 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming the 
district court’s determination that the shape of the trademark holder’s round thermostat 
would likely be found functional at trial on the merits, and therefore declining to issue a 
preliminary injunction that would block the competitor from bringing its product to 
market; however, the court did not reject the possibility that in a final decision the 
functional trade dress may be protected due to the court’s factual finding of mixed 
ornamental features); Logan Graphic Prods. Inc. v. Textus USA Inc., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1470, 1473 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“Because the TrafFix decision dealt with trade dress 
protection sought for the exact mechanism covered by an expired utility patent, and 
because the features sought to be protected here are not covered by expired patents, the 
TrafFix decision is not controlling.  However, that does not mean that Logan is relieved 
of the burden of showing that the features it seeks to protect are non-functional. . . .  The 
magistrate judge recognized that Logan retained this burden and found that Logan met its 
burden.”); Metrokane, Inc. v. Wine Enthusiast, 160 F. Supp. 2d 633, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (“The structure of the Rabbit corkscrew is clearly derived from that of the expired 
Screwpull utility patent. . . .  However, dicta in the Traffix decision suggest that a party 
seeking trade dress protection can overcome the functionality presumption. . . .  The 
Rabbit corkscrew fits this narrow exception.”). 
 126 This instability in identifying the ornamental and utilitarian features is demonstrated 
in one of these cases, in which the Seventh Circuit held with respect to a design of a 
thermostat that potentially “what was once functional may half a century later be 
ornamental.” Honeywell, 357 F.3d at 653.  
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III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR EASING THE PROBLEM STEMMING 
FROM THE NON-FUNCTIONALITY REQUIREMENT 
For over a century, industrial design laws have created 
confusion by trying to make a clear distinction between functional 
and non-functional aspects of design.127  The question is whether 
there is a way to resolve this problem and make the non-
functionality requirement more workable.  The proposal presented 
here is a pragmatic one.  Since it is impossible to define accurately 
when a design is purely functional, and since the problem of 
designs that combine both function and aesthetics is acute, it might 
be more practical not to resolve the problem at the registration 
stage, but rather to postpone it to a later stage, when a case of 
infringement is brought before a court.  Thus, whenever the 
question of the functionality of a design is raised and the answer is 
not clear-cut, the design will nonetheless be registered.  Should, 
however, the registration of the design be challenged in court in an 
infringement claim, the court will determine which features of the 
design are indeed protected.  This proposed method has a number 
of significant advantages which will be discussed below. 
First, this method should not have a chilling effect with respect 
to innovative/creative endeavor.  One possible objection to the 
proposed method of registering these functional designs is that 
doing so would hinder the innovative/creative market; designers 
might avoid using the functional features of the registered design, 
on the assumption that registration reflects conclusive 
protection.128  This problem can be easily solved by attaching a 
reservation to the registration, stating that the registered design 
raises a question of functionality, which will be decided by the 
 
 127 Non-functionality first appeared as a requirement in the English design law from 
1919, which limited registration of mechanical contrivances. See Patent and Designs Act, 
1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 80, art. 93 (Eng.) (“Design means only the features of shape, 
configuration, pattern, or ornament applied to any article by any industrial process or 
means, whether manual, mechanical, or chemical, separate or combined, which in the 
finished article appeal to and are judged solely by the eye; but does not include any mode 
or principle of construction, or anything which is in substance a mere mechanical 
device.”); see also HOWE & RUSSELL-CLARKE, supra note 81, at 35–45.  
 128 But to some extent this claim can be raised against the current legal situation too 
because some functional designs are nonetheless registered, due to the problematic 
definition of “functional design.”  
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court.  Thus, registration of partially functional designs will not 
hinder innovative/creative efforts.  This kind of reservation accords 
with the existing system which already provides for “notes” with 
respect to limitations or clarifications attached to registered 
intellectual property rights.129  According to this practice, the 
eligibility of registered intellectual property rights can be 
challenged at any time up to the end of the statutory period of 
protection, and a clarification with respect to such legal possibility 
will be attached to the design’s registration.130  It is well known 
that competitors challenge the validity of registered rights 
indirectly, by simply using or copying the needed features and 
reserving the argument over eligibility to the courts.131 
Moreover, in many jurisdictions there is no real prosecution of 
designs, and the registration of designs can be characterized more 
accurately as a deposition system.132  This scheme of deposition 
instead of prosecution has also been adopted in the E.U. 
registration system133 and by the Hague International Registration 
System.134  The deposition system is aimed at achieving probative 
goals, which promotes more certainty in the relevant market.  
However, it is not intended to function as a constitutive registry of 
proprietary rights.  Thus, in a deposition system, the mere act of 
 
 129 See Council Directive 98/71, art. 11, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 31–32 (EC). 
 130 Id. at art. 11(9). 
 131 For example, in cases of a license to use a patent, the licensee can simply stop 
paying the royalties.  In such cases, the patent’s validity often arises as a defense to an 
infringement suit against the licensee for breach of contract.  Due to this practice, patent 
owners  insert a “no-challenge” clause in the license agreements, according to which the 
licensee undertakes not to challenge the patent. See M. Natalie Alfaro, Barring Validity 
Challenges Through No-Challenge Clauses and Consent Judgments: Medmmune’s 
Revival of the Lear Progeny, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1277, 1278–82 (2008). 
 132 See Fischman Afori, supra note 5, at 1141 (“Accepting this as the main purpose of a 
design registration system means that deposit rather than comprehensive examination 
suffices: there is no waste of resources, and the designer can market the design 
immediately after creating it; registration will serve as a means to prove originality, non-
copying or prior use.”).  
 133 See Council Directive 98/71, art. 11, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 31–32 (EC). 
 134 See Geneva Act of the Hague Agreement [of 6 November 1925] Concerning the 
International Registration of Industrial Designs art. 10(1), art. 14(1), July 2, 1999 
(extending the Hague Agreement Concerning the Deposit of Industrial Designs of 1934, 
amended in 1960). 
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registration does not imply that the registered design is valid, and 
its eligibility is subject to a court’s examination at any time.135 
There are many other advantages to reviewing the functionality 
of a design in the context of an infringement claim.  As stated 
above, there is no clear test for whether a design is eligible or not, 
other than the “eye of the judge” test.136  This test is arbitrary by 
nature, and consequently, the whole system of industrial design 
law suffers from uncertainty.  Yet, as mentioned above, in practice 
the validity of registered rights is usually challenged by simply 
using or copying the needed features and reserving the argument of 
validity as a defense in court.  Therefore, an indirect challenge of 
intellectual property rights eligibility is subject to a case-by-case 
determination, according to the judges’ best understanding, and 
thus does not suffer from a different level of uncertainty than any 
other case discussed by a common law court.  The common law 
system, by nature, creates a mechanism which calls for shifting 
complicated decisions which are derived from a factual basis to the 
courts.137  Such a case-by-case resolution is the traditional common 
law method and is less disruptive than advance determination of 
eligibility with respect to proprietary rights. 
Generally speaking, this kind of solution is common in 
intellectual property law and particularly in copyright law.  The 
most problematic questions in copyright law, such as eligibility, 
scope of rights, exceptions, and limitations, where clear and certain 
rules are impossible to formulate, are resolved by applying an open 
standard on a case-by case basis in the courts.138  This pragmatic 
 
 135 See Council Directive 98/71, art. 11, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 31–32 (EC). 
 136 See HOWE & RUSSELL-CLARKE, supra note 81, at 35–37, 39. 
 137 Compare Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767 (1992) (holding 
that the trade dress of a restaurant found to be inherently distinctive may be protected 
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act without proof that the trade dress has secondary 
meaning), with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000) 
(holding that, “in an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product’s design is distinctive, and therefore protectable, only 
upon a showing of secondary meaning”).  
 138 For example, the fundamental threshold for acknowledging copyright is 
“originality,” however this threshold is not defined by statute.  Courts therefore develop 
different mechanisms and tests for applying the threshold on a case-by-case basis. See 
Elizabeth F. Judge & Daniel Gervais, Of Silos and Constellations: Comparing Notions of 
Originality in Copyright Law, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 375, 377–78 (2009) 
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approach should be used in the industrial design realm as well.  
The non-functionality requirement could therefore function as an 
open standard to be applied on a case-by-case basis. 
Thus, in light of the difficulty stemming from the non-
functionality requirement, specifically when it is impossible to 
decide in advance whether a design’s features are functional, this 
decision should be assessed in the context of a specific use.  It may 
be that with respect to a specific counter-claim some features 
would be held as functional and in another different case would be 
held as non-functional.  Putting the question of the functionality of 
a specific design in a concrete factual situation and discussing a 
competitor’s need to use a concrete feature of the design may help 
explain a court’s decision which in any case is based on the “eye of 
the judge” test.  Courts may ask for evidence regarding the need to 
use particular features of a registered design, and accordingly 
consider whether there are effective alternatives for designing the 
article.139  In this way, the test is focused on specific competing 
needs and is not theoretical, and the specific competitor will enjoy 
a legal response to his or her specific need.  In other words, the 
decision whether a feature is or is not functional would be made on 
a practical, rather than a theoretical, basis, based on evidence that 
is provided on whether protection for a design would close off 
practical alternatives for future designers. 
Finally, this proposal has the merit of eliminating the “all or 
nothing” consequences of the non-functionality requirement: the 
decision is always made in a specific context of a competing use, 
and future designers may re-open the question, leading to a 
different result, whether due to technological developments or 
 
(“Under the orthodox interpretation of originality for purposes of copyright law, there are 
four different families of standards, speaking broadly, which, ranged from most 
restrictive to most generous, are the European Union’s (‘E.U.’) personal intellectual 
creation, the United States’s Feist minimal degree of creativity, Canada’s CCH standard 
of non-mechanical and non-trivial exercise of skill and judgment, and the United 
Kingdom’s skill and labour standard.”).   
 139 For example, with respect to the screwdriver design patent discussed supra note 88, 
if another designer wishes to use the same lines of the edge of the handle for a different 
working tool, the court will need to focus only on that specific feature and examine its 
degree of functionality in light of the specific need to combine such feature in another 
product.     
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simply due to differences in the facts at issue. There is no a priori 
rejection of eligibility due to some functionality merged with the 
appearance of the design, and each case-by-case decision does not 
necessarily block future decisions with a different result because 
all decisions are referring only to the specific factual situation at 
stake.  Indeed, such decision will be eventually an in personam 
one. 
For all these reasons, shifting the non-functionality requirement 
to an open standard rule that is determined on a case-by-case basis 
would be a pragmatic solution to the unending debate over how to 
apply the non-functionality requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
Industrial design law protects the appearance of useful articles 
but not the functional features of the design.140  This non-
functionality requirement is a key element of design protection, 
and it is in fact a universal feature of such laws.  Its underlying 
rationale involves the desire to avoid undermining patent law 
provisions, which under certain strict conditions provide protection 
of functional elements.141 
In practice, however, the non-functionality requirement is 
difficult to apply.  Three major reasons for these difficulties are 
explored in this Article: the first is that it is hard (or perhaps even 
impossible) to determine definitively that a design feature is purely 
functional.142  The second is that contemporary design tends to 
combine functional and aesthetic elements, with the result that it is 
often impossible to separate between the two.143  The question then 
becomes whether the design as a whole should be deprived of 
protection.  The third reason is that functionality is an abstract 
concept that covers everything from the narrow meaning of 
“serving a technical goal”144 to the broader (and vaguer) one of 
 
 140 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see supra text accompanying note 16. 
 141 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03. 
 142 See supra Part II.  
 143 See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. 
 144 See supra Part II.A. 
AFORI_FINAL_05-12-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2010  11:23 AM 
874 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:847  
“achieving a purpose.”145  To the extent that functionality is 
understood broadly, it could reasonably be argued that aesthetics 
are also a function.  This broad reading of the non-functionality 
requirement would empty it of meaning, however.  Consequently, 
a more narrow understanding of the term “functional” is 
preferable—one that circumscribes functionality within technical 
and physical aspects. 
After analyzing the various difficulties that arise from the non-
functionality requirement, the Article discusses a proposed 
solution, under which non-functionality would no longer be simply 
treated as a threshold requirement for eligibility for design 
protection.  Instead, in cases that are not clear-cut, the issue would 
be left to courts to resolve when claims of actual design 
infringement are brought.  This is because a court would be better 
placed to determine whether a particular feature of the design was 
functional or not on a case-by-case basis in the context of a 
competing use.  Such decisions would avoid the “all or nothing” 
rule of rejecting registration of functional designs and would 
accord with the rule allowing challenges to the eligibility of 
registered intellectual property rights at all times, whether directly 
or indirectly. The non-functionality requirement would thus 
function as an open standard norm, similar to many other 
intellectual property doctrines that are employed when it is 
impossible to impose a single rule to cover a virtually limitless 
range of factual possibilities. 
 
 
 145 See supra Part II.B. 
